Just as a major NATO military campaign rages against a resurgent Taliban, rumors are ripe that the Alliance is also negotiating a political arrangement with the Taliban. Counterproductive or Complimentary? How will these two measures by NATO impact the future of Afghanistan?

On September 2, NATO troops launched a massive military operation dubbed “Operation Medusa” against the Taliban in the Panjwai and Zhari districts of Kandahar. After two weeks of intense battles and massive displacement of local population, NATO ended the operation, calling it a great success. It claims to have killed and captured more than four hundred alleged enemy fighters. NATO spokesperson Luke Knittig put the NATO casualties figure at 6, while saying that the number of wounded has not yet been established. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence has admitted one national army personnel killed and 16 NATO and Afghan forces wounded. NATO has set itself a six month deadline to eliminate the Taliban insurgency in the south.

While NATO has not admitted large scale civilian casualties, villagers reported that a number of civilians have been killed by relentless bombing and artillery barrages. Despite NATO’s assurances to exercise caution while attacking their targets in order to avoid civilian casualties, reports from the ground speak of large scale displacements and heavy civilian casualties. The Taliban also rejected the casualties figures reported by NATO and Afghan government and claim that many of the casualties reported are in fact civilians not Taliban combatants.

In the midst of heavy fighting, NATO’s Supreme Commander, Gen. James Jones asked NATO member nations to commit additional troops to the mission in Afghanistan. On Tuesday, Spain, Germany, France and Italy refused to commit additional troops, while smaller nations such as Latvia promised to contribute more. The refusal by the Alliance’s larger members is significant considering the deteriorating security conditions in the south and southeast of the country and the inability of the Afghan government to take care of its own security needs.

The intensity of fighting in the south, recent bomb and suicide attacks in the capital and the killing of Hakim Taniwal, governor of Paktia province by a suicide bomber has increased concerns about Afghanistan and its ability to recover. This is especially worrying when one learns of whole districts captured by anti-government forces. As of writing of this editorial, reports were coming in suggesting that the Fararud district in Farah province and the Delaram district in Nimruz province had been lost to the Taliban.

NATO’s Supreme Commander while speaking to media has admitted that “the organization’s member states are surprised by the level of resistance and the intensity with which they are engaging NATO troops in battles in the south”.  

Although NATO is engaged in intense battles with the Taliban and are calling on member states to contribute more troops to enable it to keep the pressure on the Taliban, rumours are abound that doors have been left open for negotiation to lead to a political settlement with the Taliban. Major Scott Lundy in a telephone conversation with Killid Weekly admitted that the Taliban have approached them for talks. This move could also be seen as a calculated move by the Taliban to discredit the government of president Karzai. By willing to directly talk to NATO, Taliban may want to convince the Afghan public that president Karzai is not in charge and hence no need to start direct talks with his government.

This development also coincides with president Musharaf’s announcement, made days before his trip to Kabul to hold talk s with the Afghan president, of a deal the government of Pakistan has made with the Pashtun tribals and local Taliban in north Waziristan, a semi-autonomous region bordering Afghanistan’s restive southern provinces. As per the terms of this accord, the local Taliban have pledged not to attack the Pakistani Army in the region, to abstain from crossing the border into Afghanistan and prevent the entry of “foreign Taliban” into Afghanistan. In return, General Musharaf has promised to withdraw his armed forces from the border region. 

The north Waziristan accord is seen as an attempt by General Musharaf to end the military and political stalemate and prevent the army’s reputation from further disrepute. The accord is a clear indication of the failure of the Pakistan army to end the militarization of north Waziristan and extend the federal government’s influence in the tribal areas.

Afghans see this accord as a betrayal by Pakistan in the war on terror and accuse its southern neighbour of giving the Taliban and its international allies a free reign in the region from where allegedly attacks are being organized against the Afghan and NATO/Coalition forces.

Many observers believe that the alleged NATO talks with Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s truce with the local Taliban in north Waziristan are interconnected, and that these efforts are aimed at paving the way for the emergence of a new political dispensation in Afghanistan, where the Taliban after more than five years of being on the run and outside the political arrangement will be invited to join a coalition government. It is to be seen whether the formation of such a coalition government would lead to more or less political stability. However, the government-making experience of the past five years, which has brought together former enemies under the watchful eyes of the international community and under the leadership of the flexible Hamid Karzai should make this one also work.

It is expected that Pakistan will play an important role in shaping such a dispensation and may even negotiate on behalf of the Taliban. This will reverse its strategic influence in Afghanistan and the region, something it had lost with the defeat of the Taliban in late 2001

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Mujahidden Factions Kept Out of Power, Allege Leaders

Leaders of the former Northern Alliance accuse the government of Hamid Karzai of political marginalisation. They claim that former mujahidden factions have been deliberately kept out of power. These allegations surfaced soon after the formation of the new cabinet, in which two key leaders of the Northern Alliance, Marshal Fahim and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, until then ministers of defence and foreign affairs respectively, were not included in the new cabinet.   

Under the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme, attempts were made to disarm irregular armed forces which were loosely associated with ministries of defence and interior. The DDR programme was followed by the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), to disarm and demobilise other armed groups which in fact existed illegally and were not formally associated with the defence and interior ministries. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police under new leadership were formed to replace these irregular and illegal armed groups, making it possible to formalise the means of legitimate violence. 

Under pressure, the leaders of these irregular and illegal armed groups have consistently tried to influence public opinion in their favour by accusing president Karzai and his American backers of attempts to malign and marginalise key former mujahidden leaders from power.

During a recent meeting with the leadership of NATO in Kabul, former Northern Alliance leader Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayyaf, who is chair of the External Affairs Committee of the Lower House of Parliament, insisted that former jihadis be re-integrated into the government's security apparatus. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary celebration marking Ahmad Shah Massoud's assassination two days prior to September 11 attacks in the US in 2001, former president Burhanuddin Rabbani and former defence minister Marshal Fahim also voiced their criticism over the removal of former mujahidden from power. They said that unless former mujahidden are incorporated into key areas of government, security will continue to deteriorate.  According to them the former mujahidden are familiar with the current challenge posed by the insurgent Taliban given their past resistance to Taliban and will therefore be able to significantly improve security. This logic ignores the fact that without American firepower and backing, the Taliban would probably still be in control of Kabul and eventually might have succeeded in capturing the few northern territories which we under Northern Alliance's nominal control. 

Their remarks received widespread media coverage, causing confusion in the minds of public. There should be no doubt as to whether these factional leaders and commanders are in positions of power.  What is important to consider is their definition of power sharing, when both vice presidents, the speakers of both houses of parliament along with their deputies, the ministers of defence and interior and the chief of army and head of National Directorate of Security, along with other cabinet members, several governors and heads of police departments in the provinces and a large number of ambassadors belong to the former mujahidden camp? Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Said Mustafa Kazimi, Mohammad Akbari, Hajji Mohammad Mohaqiq, Abdul Salam Rakiti are not only members of parliament, but they also chair important parliamentary committees.

If the Jihadi leaders' interpretation of power sharing is appointment to key government positions and also to keep their militias and armed groups under their direct control, the political and military framework which will emerge from this interpretation will throw Afghanistan back into its bloody past where commanders and warlords held sway over fiefdoms and emirates through the barrel of the gun.  Such reversal will not improve security and will only bring back the chaos and lawlessness that characterised the 1990s.

The fragmentation of the Northern Alliance which was brought about by factional and internal fighting among the many mujahidden groups paved the way for the emergence of the Taliban in the mid 1990s. Weak to resist the well organised and ideologically driven Taliban, the Alliance was corned to the northern most territories where they held patches of territory by a combination of force, bribes and sharing of benefits from illicit economic activities.

Instead of trying to undermine the current government by malicious rhetoric, former mujahidden leaders and factional commanders in or out of power should offer workable plans to restore security in the country. Furthermore, they should encourage their loyalists to join the new national army and police, which is in need of experienced troops and additional resources.

Political and security analysts believe that the Northern Alliance leaders are neither able to create an army nor restore security in Afghanistan.  By bringing pressure on the Karzai administration and NATO to be given greater share of power, they are trying to exploit the government's weakness for their own narrow and selfish benefits, while the country is fighting for its very survival. With rumours of possible negotiations with the resurgent Taliban abound, these former mujahidden factional leaders are merely trying to acquire more military and political power before that power is shared with the Taliban.

The return of factional armed groups to power would be reminiscent of the terrifying civil war period in the 1990s. Irrespective of whether one supports the north or the south, any attempt to surrender to their wicked demands will result in the disintegration of national unity and further fragmentation of society.

Afghanistan can only achieve peace and prosperity when it commands a national army and police force under the control of elected officials of an accountable government. The central government must afford equal treatment under the law to all Afghans regardless of any tribal, regional, lingual and religious consideration. It must take its duty to provide security to all citizens seriously and must not privatise security by contracting it out to non-state actors. 

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Iranian Insults: A Waste of Time

Dr. Ghulam Ali Aiansaaz, a university lecturer in Iran has published an article under the title of “Guests Are the Most Welcomed People but…” on the Iranian official Website Jaam-e-Jam on Monday, Sunbola 27th,.

This article referred to Afghans as “uninvited guests” to the “hospitable” Iranian soil.   The presence of two million Afghans was described “as a heavy burden on Iran and    Afghans were blamed for committing 36% of crimes in Iran.”  The article described Iran as a paradise for illegal Afghans who enter the Iranian soil from its eastern borders easily.  It claimed that Afghans steal jobs from Iranian citizens and cited some eight hundred such cases, taking jobs away from Iranians.

These allegations by Dr. Ainsaaz of Jaam-e-Jam were written in an extremely derogatory and biased manner towards the Afghan people whose only guilt is to have sought refuge in Iran in the face of the tragedy of war and famine at home.  Perhaps Dr. Ainsaaz should put himself in the shoes of an average Afghan refugee. Let’s look at the facts.      

Not so long ago, Khomeini proclaimed that “Islam has no borders” opening the door to a mass exodus of Afghans seeking refuge in Iran but like so many refugees around the world, from Sudan to Palestine, life in Iran failed to go much beyond the initial welcoming remarks of its then and since political leadership.

Afghans were barred from traveling from one city to another and refugee camps were transformed into prisons for Afghans.    Two million Afghan refugees were subjected to sub-human conditions, denied certain work permits and limited or no educational opportunities.  Tal-e-Sia and Sang-e-Safid Prisons were especially built for Afghans who still dread hearing even their names and Afghans were not only sent to the Iraqi fronts during the Iran-Iraq war but much of the post-war reconstruction was carried out by Afghans.

Within the Iranian society itself, Afghans have been looked down upon with many derogatory words used against them, making a difficult situation even more so and worse, massacres of Afghans took place in Sabza Maidan in Isfahan, Torbat-e-Haidari, Yazd and Araak which the Iranian government has yet to take account,

This is not to say that Afghan refugees have not benefited by their host nation. Despite the harsh realities of being a refugee, Iran still offered Afghans refuge from war and despair in our own homeland and many refugees were able to establish viable
livelihoods and attain educations unavailable to them back at home. 

This fortune has been returned to many Iranians today with hundreds of Iranians now working in Kabul and other cities around the country.  Iranians pocket millions of dollars from trade in Afghanistan since the political changes brought about in 2001.   Iran has built many commercial centers on the Iranian border in order to dump its low quality manufacturing goods on the Afghan market which benefits many Iranian businesses and Iran is trying to link its commercial activities via Cha-e-Bahar-Kandahar to the Central Asia in order to pocket millions of dollars by using Afghanistan as a transit route.   Iran is also aiming at linking Mashad to Tashkent via northern Afghanistan in order to open its way into the Central Asia.   Afghan TV’s are full of Iranian commercials.  Iran has taken full control of Helmand water in order to irrigate its Zabul and Zahidan provinces.

Rather than demonize Afghan refugees in Iran, Dr. Aliansaaz might want to take a deeper look at the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan, the realities of being an Afghan refugee as well the difficulties of being a refugee anywhere in the 21st Century.

In doing so, Dr. Aliansaaz, Jaam-e-Jam and its readers may learn something new and meaningful about what life has truly been like for Afghans in Iran the past twenty five years and something about their own humanity as Iranians today in its own neighborhood and the wider world. The bottom line is that we are neighbors and will only succeed if we work to better understand and help each other.

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Tribal Politics Can't Resolve Terrorism

Terrorism and tribal societies have little in common? A political ideology driven by violence can't be reconciled with a social and political system that is based on the traditional values of hospitality, dialogue, and communitarianism? The challenges facing Afghanistan today are rooted in an insurgency driven by religious ideology and demands for power and not terrorism. One can not wage war on a tactic. Terrorism is a violent political ideology recognizing no tribal or national borders, and no one ethnic or national group should be exclusively associated with it.

Terrorism's adherents are driven by an extreme and violent ideology. It is unlikely that the tribes and their system of governance could confront and eliminate terrorism. However, if one views this problem from a conceptually different perspective as an insurgency driven by religious and political grievances of a specific group, then the way we describe the problem and the means of dealing with it change and with this the roles of the insurgents, the tribes and the state individually and in interaction with each other.  

On his return from the US this week, President Karazi advocated the cause of re-building and fostering tribal social and political systems as a means of confronting the spread of violence. How well will the tribal systems work alongside the modern means of governance: a modern constitution, elected president, elected parliament, provincial and soon to be elected district councils, and the government bureaucracy, army and police?

The Afghan public expected that the recent tripartite meeting in the United States between George W. Bush, Hamed Karzai and Pervez Musharaf would prove fruitful in strengthening peace and uprooting terrorism in Afghanistan. Despite lots of expectations, the talks have not resulted in any substantive strategy or course of action to decisively resolve the problems of terrorism in the region. One of the main demands from the Afghan side was for exerting more pressure on Pakistan to put an end to cross-border infiltration by Taliban and Al-Qaeda into Afghanistan to carry out terrorist activities and destabilize the Afghan process.

It was also expected that the US Administration would condemn the peace treaty signed between the local Taliban in north Waziristan and the Government of Pakistan, especially in light of claims by a prominent Taliban commander in southern Afghanistan that the local Pakistani Taliban were advised by Mullah Omar to reach a deal with Pakistani authorities in order to avoid military confrontation with the Pakistani armed forces.

Few details have emerged from the closed door meeting. Almost nothing was said about the more controversial issue of alleged support given to the Taliban in Pakistani held areas bordering Afghanistan's southern and south eastern provinces. President Karzai and his government have consistently argued that unless the Taliban sanctuaries and support bases in Pakistan are dismantled, the war on terror won't be won. Could this be an attempt by president Musharaf to shift the focus from this core issue by advocating the jirga between the Pashtun tribes from both sides of the border? It is important to note that the so called Pashtun tribal leaders in the Pakistani territories have been largely sidelined by Taliban and religious fundamentalists.

While it is correct to call for the closing of Taliban support bases in Pakistan, putting the onus of dealing with rising violence on the tribes is not only unfair; allowing the Afghan government to escape its constitutional responsibility, but conceptually it is deeply flawed. Tribes must not be made scapegoats of the war on terror. In fact they are paying with their lives and properties. Caught in between, they are constantly seen with suspicion and abused by both sides: the Taliban and their allies and the Afghan government and their international sponsors.

President Karzai has spoken of re-engaging with "civil society" by which he probably means "tribal society" and holding grand jirgas on both sides of the Durand Line involving the Pashtun tribes. Over the years tribal leadership has either been decimated during the years of war or sidelined by new leadership that emerged, mainly in the form of "commanders" and "warlords". The view now, strengthened by Karzai's own tribal credentials and mentality, is perhaps that since terrorism has taken root in the tribal society, the only way to properly deal with it is through the tribal system itself. 

This is a dangerous proposition and somehow endorses Musharaf's own belief that the Taliban are trying to turn their struggle into a war for the rights of the Pashtuns. While he has every reason, more so by the bloody struggle put up by the Baluch nationalists, to be concerned about the alleged revival of Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan, the Afghans have to realize that the Taliban's fight is not driven by Pashtun nationalism but by religious fundamentalism and power.

We should be careful not to give Musharaf the smoking gun he is looking for and give the Taliban legitimacy of representing Pashtun political and nationalistic aspirations. He may want to undermine the rise of Pashtun influence in Pakistan; the Afghans have to be careful not to hold the tribes responsible for the current spate of violence or give Taliban the kind of legitimacy they are looking for. Their insurgency is driven by specific demands. This view makes it more feasible to properly handle the Taliban.

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Salary Raise of Civil Servants Effective Against Corruption

Very low salaries paid to civil servants is thought to be a key factor contributing to rising corruption in government institutions. It is a problem which successive Afghan governments have faced over the years. A cycle of war, large scale destruction, pillage and many years of economic stagnation exacerbated an already difficult pre-war situation.

Civil servants have constantly complained about low salaries, reducing them to live a hand to mouth existence. Rampant corruption has given the government a bad name, undermined its legitimacy among the public and has drawn criticism from the international community.

Extreme poverty brought on by low income compelled civil servants to take bribes in order to feed their families. Government efforts to eradicate corruption have largely failed because such efforts did not address the root cause of the problem. Much of the government’s efforts focused on rhetoric and moralizing the issue.

While debating the budget proposed for the current fiscal year, the parliament asked the ministry of finance to raise the salaries of civil servants, arguing that it is the only way to curb corruption, increase productivity and raise living standards. The ministry of finance rejected this proposal, arguing that the international community refuses to raise civil servants salaries unless wide ranging reforms are implemented in state institutions, including downsizing the existing bureaucracy. Giving in to pressure from parliamentarian, the ministry at the time agreed to raise salaries by 300 Afghanis. But this promise remained unfulfilled.  

This week, all of a sudden the Ministry of Finance announced that the World Bank has agreed to raise the salaries of civil servants. According to the ministry, the lowest civil servant salary would be US$ 80 and the highest US$ 800. The salary package will be presented to the cabinet next week for consideration. The planed increase in salaries of civil servants is hoped to some what assuage their concerns and improve their living standards and increase productivity in government institutions.

This week, the NATO command in Afghanistan announced that the country is at a tipping point and unless the living standard of ordinary Afghans is improved within the next six months, more and more people are likely to shift their sympathy to the Taliban. It called for quick and large scale reconstruction in the south which recently saw intense fighting between NATO and the Taliban.

>Reconstruction and good governance in the immediate aftermath of operation Medusa was part of NATO’s strategy to win hearts and minds and to prevent the Taliban from exploiting the public’s frustration over lack of reconstruction in their areas and presence of predatory government officials.

If the decision to raise salaries had been taken last year, things would not have been so bad today. It shows the short term thinking of Afghan policy makers and their international advisors and financiers. The government and the international community have a lot to learn from the way this issue has been handled. We shouldn’t wait until disaster strikes and then think about how to deal with it.

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Ad Hoc Measures Are Ineffective Against Corruption

The major challenge facing the Karzai Administration is corruption. The President has publicly committed his government to its fight, partly in reaction to mounting criticism from local and foreign media and donor countries. Despite the rhetoric, corruption is spreading and its impacts are being felt throughout our society.

President Karzai has set up paper-pushing commissions to address corruption within his administration and state institutions. The government appoints too many commissions while there is no measurable change in the basic processes by which state affairs are conducted on behalf of the people of this country. Instead of declaring jihad against this or that evil and setting up commissions, the right approach would be to address the root causes of corruption. We have to ask ourselves what gives birth to corruption, who benefits from it, who provides the environment of impunity and how we can address these.

Vetting and purging corrupt officials and instituting legal proceedings against those believed to be involved in corruption is the first step. The government has started to do this, and it should remain steadfast even when it is politically inconvenient.

The Ministry of Finance recently announced that the salaries of government employees will be increased. If put into practice, this move could curb corruption to an extent. To eliminate corruption, the clean-up operation has to start at the top with prominent politicians and state officials. Prosecuting or dismissing low-ranking employees will not end the problem. Due consideration must be given to their grim working and living conditions. A longer-term solution is to come up with a standardized public administration code. Simply narrowing the gap between the salaries of high-ranking and low-ranking civil servants will not change much. Placement and salary scales of civil servants should be decided on the basis of merit. Meritocracy must replace nepotism.

With President Karzai's blessings, Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabet recently launched the government’s seemingly tough anti-corruption campaign. Despite a well-orchestrated media element, Sabet's efforts are being hampered from the top. While in Amarkheil’s case, the Attorney General may have used rush judgment, as a result unnecessarily complicating his own work. Some officials want to protect friends and family, while others are ensuring their political friends and allies are not targeted. Public administration reform can not be effective when the rule of law is compromised for reasons of personal and political expediency. If the government is serious about accountability it must implement its reform agenda across the board and no one should be unduly protected.

The growing drug economy compounds matters — not only does it widen the net of corruption, it makes anti-corruption efforts almost impossible. Key government officials and political allies of the president are suspected of rent-seeking from the drug trade. The sudden removal of Kabul International Airport Border Police Chief Amin Amarkheil – who was vocal about his fight against drug traffickers – comes as a surprise and serves as an example of how some officials are standing in the way of reform.

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Political efforts prove effective

In the aftermath of 9/11, the presence of the international coalition forces in Afghanistan provided a golden chance for reconstruction and rehabilitation after more than two and a half decades of war and bloodshed. But the strength and  reemergence of the anti-government elements that had regrouped and concentrated in North Waziristan and Quetta washed our hopes in a big number of the provinces.

International coalition forces responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the country, engaged in a bitter and hard fight with the insurgents due to their increasing strength. For the two years the coalition forces and the Taliban have been encountering in massive confrontations instead of the previous hit and run tactics, thus increasing the instability in our country clearly shows that the military and guns are not the only solutions for this crisis.

The President of Afghanistan has not concealed his disapproval of and has criticized the tactics of the coalition forces in conducting military operations without proper intelligence and coordination with the Afghan National Army to sweep anti-government forces.

After NATO assumed the command of the operations in Afghanistan and thoroughly assessed the mistakes, the organization pledged to consult and conduct operations with Afghan government and rebuilding the areas engaged in military operations makes their top priority. In this way NATO broke the deadlock and started rebuilding Panjwayi district in Kandahar, and in Kabul the Action Group was formed to coordinate all future military operations with Afghan government.

This collaboration provided government of Afghanistan with a broader role to play in resolving the crisis. In the past particular elements in Pakistan were blamed for interfering in the country’s affairs but the government of Afghanistan didn’t tried to negotiate with those parties who were somehow against the interference of InterServices Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.

Current situation has paved the way for communication and negotiations and Mr Karzai contacted Esfandyaar Wali, Chairperson of National Awami party and Mulana Fazul-Rahman head of the Jamiatay Ulamai Islam either through letters or direct phone conversation to hold tribal Jirgas on both sides of the border and the withdrawal of NATO forces from Mosa Qala shows the active diplomacy of Kabul administration in breaking this deadlock. If this process was adopted much earlier such dreadful consequences would not have been faced.

The offer of talks with Hekmatyar and Mullah Omer on condition if they cut their contacts with foreign elements shows how Kabul is gradually and step by step pushing Islamabad back in terms of influence.

These tactics have put a direct effect on the people of the areas struck by crisis to come alive and play their role in bringing calm and peace. A good example of the current politics can be seen in Helmand where people are living in peace and the displaced families returned back since the negotiations.

Political maneuvers, negotiations, movements, understanding and truces are important ways to over come the problems beside the military operations, otherwise only military confrontations and fire exchange will never resolve the problem but will rather increase the civilian casualties. The government opponents always try to bank in on people’s disillusionment and provoke them against the government and confine the government to its battle fronts. These efforts of the opponents have to be averted with coming out the entrenched and starting negotiations with the people.

For those who think nationally, the recent efforts of the government are justifiable and are considered benefiting our national unity. These efforts have to be followed up despite all the risks it contains. The government must not confine itself to its military fronts; otherwise, the chance will be missed.

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MILITARY FORCE NOT A SOLUTION

The aerial attacks on suspected terrorists and Taliban militants, like last week’s missile strike on a Pakistani religious school in Baujar that killed at least 80, are disturbing on two levels.

One, the strike - ostensibly intended to eliminate Taliban and terrorist threats -  accomplishes the opposite. Such bombings are collective punishment and the tidal wave of anger that has followed is entirely justified.  Independent accounts from the tribal region indicate that while madrassah clerics had militant links, ordinary boys studied at the school. Pro-Taliban supporters who argue that the U.S. and its so-called “War on Terror” allies are unjustly targeting innocent Muslims have been further emboldened and not just in Baujar. Nato’s Operation Medusa in southern Afghanistan destroyed the homes and livelihoods of thousands of residents, who are supposed to survive on British hand-outs of mineral water and biscuits in the interim. Considering the slow record of reconstruction in the country, coupled of course with Nato’s continued inability to secure the region, the Taliban are still best positioned to fill the political vacuum in the south through their trademark rule of fear.

Even assuming that all those inside the Pakistani madrassah were militants, the bombing aggrandizes and inflames an already precarious situation along the Pak-Afghan border. Targeting rank and file militants is not a long-term solution - indeed it is not even a short-term solution. Nato and Afghan forces will simply continue to face more fighters given that the disturbing cycle of violence breeds militancy. 

All this highlights the total poverty of imagination that has been the “War on Terror.” In five years, neither the U.S. nor Nato have learned any lessons about the limits of military force in fighting Taliban and other insurgents who cross freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan to launch attacks. Bombings are expensive political dressing. Nato needs to look no further than the failure of its most recent operations in Panjwayi for proof. Attacking ordinary fighters at the cost of wholesale destruction of villages, farms - and the invariable civilian casualties -  is nonsensical particularly when the Nato commander himself warns that up to 70 percent of Afghans will switch their allegiance to the Taliban if the war continues unabated. Furthermore, the Karzai Administration looks complicit and weak from the vantage point of the war’s victims. A government dependent on international aid and rife with corruption is naturally unable to do anything for its citizens.

The situation is, for all intents and purposes, not within the control of any force or government. Kabul is bracing for a rare winter offensive and Islamabad continues its two-track policy of selective crack-down on terrorists while ignoring activities in the tribal region. Until there are mass arrests of key Taliban based in Quetta and other Pakistani cities, until law and order is established and guaranteed for Afghans in the south and  elsewhere, until the mass bombings cease, there will be no peace. 

Afghans are, understandably, fed up though it is not even a matter of patience running out. It is a matter of justice and the continued lack of it.

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Does the recent Democratic victory in the US matter for Afghanistan?

While Democrats are celebrating their sweeping gains in Washington this past week, some Afghan policy makers here and abroad are starting to wonder how the changes in Washington will impact Afghanistan, especially in light of President Karzai's close alliance with the Republicans since his own ascendancy to power.

During the past five years, President Karzai has more or less allowed free reign to the Bush Administration and its neocon ideology in Afghanistan, condoning the neocons insistence that freeing Afghanistan from Al Qaida and the Taliban would somehow make the USA, Afghanistan and the world a safer place.

The result has been a largely unchecked war in the south of the country with implications for the whole of the country.

The fact is that under the leadership of Karzai and Bush, military spending in the hunt for Al Qaida and Taliban forces out-spent reconstruction more than ten to one. With the emphasis placed on war, Afghanistan's rising insecurity problems and lack of real reconstruction progress today should come as no surprise.

Word has it that the Democrats will shift more attention and resources back to Afghanistan but the challenges of Iraq will likely take up most of their time once Congress is back in session.

Whether Republicans or Democrats are in control really makes no difference. Either way, America will continue to maintain a high degree of influence over Afghanistan.

What is different today is that the victory of the Democrats has created a window of opportunity for President Karzai and our young Parliament to be more proactive about how we manage our bi-lateral relationships from now on.

Rather than waste additional time wondering how the new Democratic lead House and Senate will respond to Afghanistan both us as Afghan citizens and President Karzai must start thinking about what we really want from our new partners in Washington rather than just be lead by them

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Demonstrate Transparency: Media Tells Parliament

Last Monday, media representatives were expelled from the plenary session of the Afghan parliament convened to discuss increase in wages and perks and privileges of members.

The incident has been widely condemned by the public. They accuse Afghan parliamentarians of trying to keep the public in the dark while trying to milk more benefits for themselves from the state. Instead of expending their energies on fattening their own pockets, Afghans are demanding from their parliamentarians to be more concerned about the deteriorating situations in the country and to do something about it.

Outraged by this incident, the mainstream independent media has threatened to boycott future parliamentary sessions, which in effect will end direct reporting from the floor of the parliament. This is not the first time journalists are being denied access to parliamentary debates. However, the National Association of Journalists has adopted a more conciliatory approach and has suggested to meet with members of parliament to resolve the deadlock.

As per its Rules of Procedure, the parliament is authorized to hold some of its sessions behind closed doors when discussing issues which are highly sensitive or pertain to the country's national security or where some form of consensus needs to be built before a public discussion can be held. Issues which are not so sensitive should ideally be openly discussed in the presence of media to allow the general public to have access to parliamentary debates. Parliamentarians should not undermine the media's role as a bridge between citizens and their elected representatives by blocking media's access to open sessions. The public has the right to know what their elected representatives are discussing and how their interests are being represented.

Instead of focusing on people's problems, members of Afghanistan's nascent parliament are demanding increase in wages for themselves for up to a 100,000 Afghanis, 8000 Afghanis for their drivers, 12000 Afghanis for their secretaries, specials number plates for their vehicles, diplomatic passports for themselves and their families and a new housing complex to live in. Many believe that not only members of parliament, but many senior government officials have already lost faith in Afghanistan's future. Demanding a diplomatic passport for eventual escape is an indication of how short-term their thinking is. How can we, the general public be made to believe in the future when the rulers are so uncertain about their own future and the future of this county?

Issues of rampant corruption and mismanagement of resources by parliament has also attracted the media and public's attention. In a recent article, the Afghan Daily WAISA reported wastage of resources and huge expenditures by parliament's secretariat staff, while it is being said that some parliament members use their own private cars and bill their own expenses for lack of support from the secretariat.

According to WAISA, the UNDP managed Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SALE) project has so far disbursed 12 million United States dollars to support the work of the Afghan parliament. It is being alleged that much of this money has been pocketed by corrupt secretariat officials.

The embattled Afghan parliament ought to address these damaging allegations and begin a new chapter in its relation with media. Parliament and media can draw strength from each other. The incident of last Monday must not be allowed to further strain relations between them.

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Afghans welcome call for peace from Pakistan's Pashtuns

A genuine call for peace emerged from Pakistan this week. On November 20th, hundreds of political leaders and tribal chiefs organized by the Awami National Party, a small, secular Pashtun political party gathered for a Jirga to distance Pasthuns from the Islamic extremism of the Taliban and to call upon on the government of Pakistan to stop channeling support to the Taliban.

The ANP's head, Afsandyar Wali referred to the Pasthtun's traditional values as being hijacked by the Taliban and "drowned in a sea of blood" and called on Pashtun's to stand united for peace" by denouncing terrorism and counter the impression that has been created by the Taliban that being Pasthun is somehow synonymous with Al Qaida, terrorism and the Taliban lead insurgency in Afghanistan.

A number of speakers at the Jirga, such as Humayun Khan, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and Bismillah Khakar, a Pasthun member of the Baluchistan National Assembly, also used the forum to challenge Islamabad's claim that Pakistan only wants the best for Afghanistan. Khan and others claimed that Pakistan, despite strong denials from President Musharef and the ISI, was allowing the Taliban to operate freely within Pakistan, thereby giving the Taliban the space they needed to fuel their insurgency within Afghanistan, an insurgency which has claimed the lives of thousands of Afghan civilians this year alone and destabilized the country's chances for peace after nearly three decades of war.

In terms of specific allegations, several tribal chiefs at the Jirga claimed that the Pakistani military was helping the Taliban "move large amounts of ammunitions to border areas" in preparation for a new, Spring offensive to topple the Karzai government and NATO forces. Islamabad quickly responded to the Jirga with a strong denial of such allegations.

With or without the support of the ISI; with or without Musharef's blessing, the fact is that there is enough independent evidence showing a militant Taliban organizational presence within Pakistan, with movements of armed Taliban forces from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

Actions speak louder than words.

If Kabul and Islamabad continue to place the blame on each other, then the positive actions of the tribal leaders who met on 20 November in Peshawar to denounce extremism will surely be "drowned in a sea of blood" and those best equipped to fight extremism, Muslim moderates, will once again be sidelined in favor of extremists.
If Pakistan is truly serious about fighting terrorism and supporting peace in neighboring Afghanistan then it should find the courage to publicly endorse the ANP and other moderate elements of Pakistani society. It should also be quick to initiate an honest debate within government on how to strip the Taliban of its oxygen within Pakistan.

If Afghanistan is truly serious about peace, moderation and democracy on its own soil, it must stop blaming Islamabad for all its problems and find the courage to emulate the moderate, creative actions of groups such as Pakistan's ANP with the formation of a political movement committed to traditional yet progressive and peaceful Pashtun values.

Ultimately the best hope for defeating the Taliban is if moderate Pashtun voices within Pakistan and Afghanistan are given the political space to denounce and confront the Taliban in Pashtun terms.

Otherwise, Kabul, NATO, Washington and Islamabad's reliance on fighting the Taliban insurgency militarily will only strengthen the Taliban and come Spring, 2007 we will be no closer to peace in Afghanistan, the region or the world.

The only real winners in such a scenario will be the very terrorists the Global War on Terror vowed to defeat after 9/11 and the military arms dealers who supply both warring sides. The losers, yet again, will largely be civilians caught in the cross-fire of what is now becoming a prolonged, senseless war.

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Are more NATO troops really the solution for Afghanistan ?

NATO's struggle to defeat a rising insurgency in South and South East Afghanistan along with its failure to secure additional troops at this week's Alliance summit in Riga are being promoted by many foreign policy experts as a failure for NATO and a victory for the Taliban and other Islamic extremists.

A set back for NATO, however, should not be confused with a set back for Afghanistan . NATO's struggle to defend its post Cold War raison d'etre both overstates the organization's capacity and responsibility in Afghanistan .

The widely promoted assumption that more NATO troop numbers and US military action are the only remedy for defeating the Taliban threat in Afghanistan is both naive and dangerous. The more NATO expands its operation in Afghanistan and the more the US military pursues its myopic hunt for Taliban and Al Qaida forces, the more it risks the lives of its own soldiers and the less the international community has to invest in Afghanistan's National Army and Police, reconstruction and fostering civil society.

Each NATO soldier costs an average of $5,000 a month to maintain in Afghanistan while the average ANA soldier takes home $60 a month. A pay raise plus a more robust training program for ANA and ANP soldiers would surely attract more Afghans to serving the national army and for those who are already part of it, reduce the high rate of desertion. The resources spent on an expanded NATO and US military mission in Afghanistan should be replaced with a new, four step strategy.

The first step of this strategy is perhaps the most difficult because it requires the moral authority and courage of the United States to end its' "hunt for Taliban and Al Qaida." NATO cannot assert itself as a stabilizing force in Afghanistan as it did in Kosovo and Bosnia , if the US Defense Department is waging its own, parallel, war on terror in Afghanistan .

Since 9/11, Washington has more or less justified any means in its mission to eliminate Al Qaida and its Afghan sponsors, the Taliban. In doing so, it has only emboldened its enemies and weakened its allies.

Abuses at the US bases in Bagram and Guantanomo along with house raids and searches of women, aerial bombings of civilian populations, partnerships with war lords and lack of coordination with NATO forces have only weakened America 's moral authority since 9/11, a position that insurgents have used to their full advantage in Afghanistan .

The only thing the US has to show in return for its approach to date is a long list of dead or captured enemy combatants and civilian casualties along with a growing insurgency in Afghanistan 's South and South East that is benefiting from a growing narcotics trade and governmental corruption.

The second step involves a redefined NATO mission. If the US would agree to scale back its own war in Afghanistan, NATO forces could focus on paving the way for a more robust ANA and ANP build-up, mending relations in Afghanistan's Southern Belt and applying its technical and engineering resources towards supporting Afghanistan's lagging reconstruction programs.

he best bet for defeating Islamic extremism, in Afghanistan and elsewhere is to nurture and invest in moderate elements of society. This relates to the third step in the strategy. Such elements of a civil society hold the moral authority, community based legitimacy and most of all, cultural knowledge to challenge extremist forces. In the case of Afghanistan , there are a number of progressive Afghan elements which the international community has yet to tap into for support and the reliance on a largely military based approach the past five years has left little room for such moderating elements to emerge and diffuse tensions.

If Washington and Brussels could find the political courage to take a step back, the public space for moderate players within Afghan society would finally have a chance to play the role they are far better suited to play than any foreign military force.

What has and will continue to embolden extremist movements such as the Taliban and Hizbi Islami in Afghanistan and Al Qaida internationally is the international community's reliance to fight its Global War on Terror militarily. Islamic extremism and terrorism is nothing but a corrupt state of mind. A military based approach to eliminating extremism is like adding fuel to a fire.

Good intelligence gathering and sharing is still vital to preventing future terrorist attacks and military intervention should be used more selectively, but with 900% more money spent on a military campaign than on strengthening the Afghan state and society by international donors, Afghanistan 's deteriorating security situation should come as no surprise.

Until a greater investment in progressive elements within Afghan civil society and the public space for them to maneuver is made, any gains made in Afghanistan by the Afghan people, NATO and in the name of fighting terrorism the past five years will be lost.

The fourth and critical step in the strategy involves a genuine commitment from regional neighbors to mature and move from their Cold War Era political games to a new era for their citizens.

The 21st century holds a vast array of threats for central and south Asia far more daunting than terrorism. From the world's largest number of young people with limited economic opportunities, high illiteracy rates, over population, vast ecological challenges such as water shortages to desertification, major natural disasters to content with and the legacy of armed conflict, all those countries playing games with Afghanistan are wasting precious resources and undermining the potential of their own citizens.

Both Afghanistan and its neighbors must realize that they and the entire world's fate are increasingly interrelated. The saying "you are only as strong as your weakest link" is perhaps more true today than at anytime in history. Pakistan must understand that a successful Afghanistan means a successful Pakistan , not the other way around. The politics of the last century no longer have meaning for this century.

During the next decade, the region as a whole will face major human and environmental upheavals with serious implications for the entire world. Unless the region's leaders mature and international powers such as the US and NATO give room for positive elements of civil society to emerge, the problems of today in Afghanistan and beyond will pale in comparison to what is just around the corner.

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Kasuri's Kabul Visit Did Little to Improve Pak-Afghan Relations

“Hopefully, as a result of our talks, confidence between the two governments will improve further” Pakistan's Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri declared during his December 7-8 visit to Kabul.

This cordial remark by the Pakistani Foreign Minister has done little to repair the damage caused by previous remarks he made to NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer when Kasuri suggested that “it was time for Afghanistan to form a joint government with the Taliban, that President Karzai should be excluded from this new government and that the defeat of NATO forces in Afghanistan was inevitable.”

These remarks of Kasuri's contradict the official line coming out of Islamabad about the desire to foster “Enlightened Moderation” in Pakistan.

If Islamabad is truly committed to the peace jirga, it would have met Kabul half way and placed the full force of its political commitment behind moving the jirga forward.

Kasuri's remarks, so soon before visiting Kabul and the lack of agreed upon specifics during his visit, essentially sent the message that Pakistan only wants to nurture “Enlightened Moderation” in words, not in deeds, and that the proposed peace jirga is no longer a top agenda item for Islamabad.

The bottom line is that Mr. Kasuri's remarks did more to build the confidence of Taliban insurgents based in Pakistan than confidence between the two neighbors at this critical time in history.

But why would Islamabad go to the effort of endorsing the peace jirga last September when it was first proposed but pull back from it now?

One possibility is that once Islamabad saw the momentum the peace jirga was actually gaining for moderate Pashtuns within its own territories, it felt its strategic interests threatened.

These interests, for a number of years now, have involved an unstated strategic alliance between the government of Pakistan and extremist elements within the NWFP not with moderate elements from the same territory.

The peace jirga essentially means replacing Islamabad's old friends with new ones. This is a hard pill to swallow because it means an end to longstanding relationships that have benefited a cross section of Pakistani politics.

Suddenly supporting moderate Pashtun elements means ending old relationships and forging new ones and this is hard for any country to achieve without real political will.

The saying, actions speak louder than words seem to hold true for Islamabad more than ever.

If President Musharaf is truly committed to his vision of “Enlightened Moderation” that he has been promoting in Western cities during his book tour the past few months, then a real backing of moderates from his own country and their participation in the peace jirga with Afghanistan will go much further than Kasuri's mere "hopes" that his visit to Kabul will build confidence between the two countries.

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Afghans Demand Justice

As December 10th marked International Human Rights Day, President Karzai emotionally attributed the suffering of Afghans to foreign troops and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.

It seems the President forgot to shed a tear for the suffering caused by his own willingness to allow men with a proven track record of human rights abuses to maintain and expand their power in Afghanistan the past five years.

While the President may be correct in not having the power to control the actions of outside forces, he does have the power to act upon the call of average Afghans to bring those Afghans who tore and continue to tear the country apart to justice.

Instead, the President has allowed a number of individuals with proven human rights abuse records to maintain their power bases both in Kabul and the provinces and has announced his forgiveness of their past crimes in return for their support of the country's new political direction.

The combination of these two actions by the President have only added to the suffering he blamed others for on International Human Rights Day because their continued presence in the running of the nation only holds the nation and its people down.

What legal and moral right does one man have to forgive on behalf of an entire nation?

The inclusion of those who lead the country by the sword the past three decades in its future may have seemed a politically convenient step for President Karzai but the result has been a denial of justice and a denial of the public space for a new generation of leaders, without blood on their hands, from emerging.

The President is correct when he says Afghans are suffering greatly under the hand of foreign influences but it is suffering just as much if not more under the weight of those whose past actions still haunt this nation.

This country cannot heal its wounds, rebuild and move forward unless it reconciles the injustices of its past and prevent those in positions of power to create new violations on a daily basis.

As much of the world looks ahead towards a new year, perhaps President Karzai should also look towards developing a fresh, new start for Afghanistan.

Purging his own government of those individuals with an internationally proven record of human rights abuses and initiating a genuine truth and reconciliation process would be such a fresh, new start.

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All Pashtuns are not Taliban

During the past five years many international media reports loosely interchange the words Pashtun and Taliban. In the process, a false image has been created of all Pashtuns supporting the Taliban and of all Taliban being of Pashtun origin.

The reality is that the average Pashtun is not part of the Taliban movement and the average Talib, neither prior to 9/11 nor today is necessarily a Pashtun.

True that the movement is based primarily in Pashtun territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan but it receives both fighters and financial support from a wide variety of ethnic and national backgrounds and to say lump all Pasthun into the Taliban camp is akin to saying that all Southern Americans were members of the Ku Klux Klan.

Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, the vast majority of Pashtuns are participating at all levels of rebuilding Afghanistan alongside all the other ethnic groups in politics, the national army and police and in reconstruction and like all Afghans prior to the overthrow of the Taliban and today, are suffering under the influence of the Taliban.

Those Pashtun areas that seem to be supporting the Taliban are in most cases doing so because neither the central government nor NATO forces have exhibited the power to prevent the Taliban from establishing a presence in their communities.

As one Pashtun tribal elder told this magazine as far back as 2003, “the Taliban are on our doorstep but we have yet to see anyone from Kabul or the international community to visit our village. The Taliban come here daily, showing their strength. We do not want to support them but what choice do we have when we are forced to?” Three years later, Pashtuns in such areas as Paktika, Kandahar and Uruzgan are still caught in the cross-fire. This time it is between the West's increasingly intensified Global War on Terror (GWOT) and a growing Taliban insurgency that represents only a small number of extremists who have the advantage of being well funded and well protected by larger, outside elements.

If the international media is going to cover this complex story, it needs to do a better job of accurate reporting. Constantly combining the terms Pashtun and Taliban only serves to tell half the story and unfairly stigmatizes an entire ethnic group that is actually suffering just as much as any ethnic group in Afghanistan and is just as committed to the peace and stability of the country and the region.

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Government Must Adopt Clear Stance on Mining of Durand Line by Pakistan

In response to mounting criticism from Kabul and its Western backers for not doing enough to stop the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda from crossing the long and porous border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, popularly know us the Durand Line, and eager to show that it is on the side of the West in the 'War on Terror', Pakistan announced last December it will plant land mines and build a fence on parts of its long, rugged frontier with Afghanistan.

Although Pakistan's professed reason for mining and fencing the border is to stop Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan and help NATO and Coalition troops gain greater strategic advantage over Taliban, its strategy in fact is driven by hopes of attaining its own narrowly perceived national interests: legitimizing and securing its north western frontier with Afghanistan. Resolving the border dispute is highly significant for Pakistan as it increasingly feels threatened by India on one side and a belligerent, allegedly pro-India Afghanistan on the other. The Pak-Afghan dispute over the Durand Line dates back to the time of Pakistan's creation in 1947. Successive Afghan governments refused to recognize the line and tensions at least on one occasion almost drove the two neighbours to all out war. Because of the prevailing circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan is in a good position to exploit the situation for its own ends and advance its national interests in a region where historically it had little control or influence. Initially Afghans viewed Pakistan's suggestions of mining and fencing the disputed border region as a convenient way for Pakistan not to address the real issue and evade its responsibility of going after Taliban leadership reportedly headquartered in Quetta, Baluchistan. Afghans opposed the plan by maintaining that border fencing and mining is impractical, that if Pakistan wanted, Taliban could continue to cross it and instead demanded that Taliban leadership in Pakistan be captured and their sanctuaries destroyed.

Despite strong objections from the Afghan Government and Pashtuns on both sides of the line, followed by voicing of similar concerns by some Western countries, work on fencing and mining the border areas separating the two countries continuous. Paktika Province Governor Akram Khpalwak claimed on January 7 that Pakistan had begun to fence and mine its disputed southeastern border with Afghanistan.

Canada, for example, objected to the mining of the border areas on the grounds that it violates the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. The Afghan government on the other hand avoided addressing the real issue of concern and instead issued an emotional appeal. Self-righteous expression of emotions seems to have the upper hand in Afghan politics these days. The Afghan government objected to the mining of the border areas on humanitarian grounds, saying such a move if allowed will permanently separate the closely linked Pahstun communities and disrupt their lives. The Pashtuns tribes straddling the disputed border have refused to recognize it as an international boundary and frequently cross it without much regard for either Afghan or Pakistani claims of sovereignty over it.

Instead of opposing the Pakistani plans purely on humanitarian grounds, the government should have clearly articulated its position, mobilized public opinion at home and abroad and opposed the plan for political reasons, as common sense require. The fencing and mining of the border line if not opposed will strengthen Pakistan's position which has insisted since its creation that the Durand Line drawn up by British India in 1893 is a legitimate international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan's real motif behind fencing the border is not to prevent Taliban and Al Qaeda from crossing it. The border is too long and porous to be effectively controlled. The reality is different. Pakistan is exploiting growing Western concerns about Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan from its territory which is undermining NATO and Coalition and Afghan efforts to stabilize southern and eastern Afghanistan. Taliban insurgent activities last year sharply increased troop casualty figures.

In apparent response to Western concerns and demands for action to stop the growing tide of Taliban insurgency, Pakistan has decided to mine and fence the border. Pakistan's strategic objective of resolving the border question with Afghanistan and the West's desire to protect its forces in Afghanistan have splendidly coincided. By fencing the Durand Line, Pakistan for the first time since its creation more than half a century ago is in a position to clearly demarcate the disputed boundary and asserts its authority over the border areas on its side of the line on which Afghans continue to have territorial claims.

In view of Pakistan's strategic moves, the Afghan government must clarify its position by not only opposing the Pakistani plan on humanitarian grounds but more importantly should stop beating about the bush and say what it really wants to but has not said it yet: i.e. Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line and oppose its mining and fencing by Pakistan because such a move will legitimize it in the eyes of the world.

On top of mobilizing public opinion at home and abroad, the Afghan government should raise the issue at international forums such as at the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference in order to counter Pakistani designs. The less than frank stance of the Afghan government on such a vital issue will give credence to speculations that the Afghan government may have secretly agreed to a deal. There is no escape from the issue and instead of dodging it; the government and the nation must find the courage and the resources, intellectual as well as political to secure Afghanistan's national interests.

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The Travails of the Afghan Constitution

After months of preparations and consultations, the post-Taliban constitution was approved by people's representatives in early 2004. In the three years since first adopted, the constitution, enjoying a broad national legitimacy, has seen many challenges to its authority and reach by men in power. This reality is a symptom of a larger problem: unchecked and unaccountable power overriding the rule of law.

>Despite mass consultations and revision of an earlier draft, when the text of the constitution was presented to people's chosen representatives for approval, it became a major point of contention between differing interests. Over 20 days, it was hotly debated by all of Afghanistan 's peoples. However, not everyone was pleased. The debates instead of leading to a common consensus lead to many divisions. Initial efforts to avoid voting on the constitution and to adopt it by majority consensus were quickly swept away. The constitutional text became a bargaining chip in the hands of extremist elements for securing narrow interests.

The Loya Jirga, among other things, was consulted on three important issues: choosing between a presidential and parliamentary system of government, deciding which of Afghanistan languages became the language of the national anthem, and selecting the national languages of the country. The major point of disagreement was over the system of government. A section of the constituent assembly preferred a prime minister at the head of government. In the absence of a broad consensus and maximalist positions being pushed by differing groups, the legislative assembly was deadlocked. This was certainly not good news for its main sponsors the United States , its Western allies and the United Nations.

The use of political influence by the US and the UN was crucial to getting a deal through. In parallel with the wishes of its protégé Hamid Karzai and his followers, the US voted for the presidential system. Once the major contentious issues were out of the way, agreement was easily forged on other key constitutional principals such as democracy, civil society, the freedom of expression, independent media and political parties, equality of men and women, the free market economy and the separation of power among the three branches of government.

The adoption of the new constitution brought relief and joy to the nation. After three decades of lawlessness and suffering, the Afghan people warmly welcomed it and pinned their hopes upon a future of respect for the rule of law. They looked forward to a time, not in too distant a future, when the powerful men who had abused them for so long would kneel before the law and respect their human dignity and property. They were soon disappointed.

Even though Afghanistan 's new constitution is highly inclusive and democratic and a good instrument for the development and progress of the country, time has proved that its executors and those who were responsible for overseeing it have failed to translate its many promises into tangible benefits for the ordinary citizen. The pledge of respect for the constitution as the highest law in the country turned out to be mere words.

But why? The answer is simple. Because those charged with ensuring the widest possible respect for its provisions failed in their sacred duty and instead of being the protectors of the supreme law, they unashamedly became the abusers of that law. Greed for power and riches has not stopped these people from committing some of the most horrible crimes imaginable. When those charged with the affairs of the nation show no regard for the sacred law of the land, there is little hope for the rest of us.

Respect for the constitution starts with the individual. Each one of us has to make an effort in this regard. But unless the broader environment in which breaches of the law occur is not improved and unless rulers are made to realise that they are here not to govern us but to serve us under the protection afforded to each person by the constitution, and that ultimately they are accountable to the people, simply having a constitution is not going to make anyone's life better. It is not enough to commit the constitution to memory. We must live by it.

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Insecurity on the Rise Despite Security Sector Reform

In the past five years since the fall of the Taliban, a number of attempts have been made to strengthen the capacity of Afghan security forces to enable it to provide basic security to the population. The result is a mixed bag of few success and many failure stories. The Afghan police reform process under the auspices of the German and the United States governments have fallen short of expectations. For example, the total strength of the Afghan National Police force is still below the agreed level. The New York Times last December reported that a joint report by the Pentagon and the State Department has found that the American-trained police force in Afghanistan is largely incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work, and that managers of the $1.1 billion training program cannot say how many officers are actually on duty or where thousands of trucks and other equipment issued to police units have gone.

The reforms implemented by the Interior Ministry have been largely ineffectual. Instead of addressing the rout cause of the problem, i.e. reforming a largely unqualified and abusive police force, much of the ministry's reform initiatives have focused on transferring powerful and corrupt police chiefs from one province to the next. Last week, the third round of police reform was introduced through the framework of the ministry. Only time could tell how effective the latest round of reform will be.

The hard reality however is that the security situation in most parts of the country including the urban centers is fast deteriorating, leading to increased public concern for individual and collective safety. Theft, murder and targeted assassinations, including killings of government employees frequently take place in both the country's capital and its provinces. Much of this criminal activity takes place in broad day light. During the past week, the government announced the killing of five government employees in Khost, Helmand, Kandahar and Kabul . Islamuddin Mohammadi, an MP of the lower house, was one of those killed last week in the Kart-e-Parwan neighbourhood of Kabul . He was a former member of the Harakat-e-Enqelab-e-Islamic Party [‘Movement of the Islamic Revolution'] and governor of Bamyan during the Taliban regime. The murderer succeeded in escaping from the scene of crime.

What is really surprising is that thieves and murderers routinely succeed in evading capture by local police after committing crimes. Instead of being pro-active in preventing crimes or bringing perpetrators to justice after a crime has taken place, the police are simply content to report rising crime statistics to an ever alarmed public. The public feels highly insecure on account of the police force's inability or unwillingness to stem the tide of increased criminal activities. They suspect that criminals are working their way into the police force. Or perhaps it is the other way round: the police are working their way into the world of crime. The truth may be a combination of both. Because of low wages and unchecked corruption, criminals find it easy to influence the security forces.

Most analysts believe that there are more sinister political reasons behind such criminal activities and the deteriorating state of security. They argue that these actions are carried out by a few unhappy elements in order to discredit the newly-appointed authorities. Their unhappiness could be explained by their loss of power because of changes brought to the leadership and the direction of the reform process.

The question arises: what happened to the billions of dollars of the international community's funds for capacity building of the police and other security forces? And why hasn't the performance of our police force improved despite such massive expenditures? What is lacking, vision or money? Will more dollars or Euros for security sector reform, particularly the police force change anything?

Last week the New York Times reported that the US president planned to ask Congress for a new $10.6 billion assistance package for Afghanistan , primarily to beef up the country's security forces. The aid request would include $8.6 billion for training and equipping Afghan security forces and would go toward increasing the size of Afghanistan 's national army by 70,000 and its local police forces by 82,000.

Again, only time could tell if more dollars will make a better Afghan National Police.

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More Development Aid and Less Expenditure on Security Sector is Answer to Afghanistan Mounting Problems

In lead up to an anticipated Taliban spring offensive international assistance to Afghanistan has increased. The United States recently committed US$10.6 billion, which include $8.6 billion to beef up the country's security forces. The United States will also contribute armoured vehicles and light arms to the Afghan National Army. The European Union has promised a €600 million assistance package for Afghanistan for 2007-2010. The package will focus on three key priority areas: reform of the justice sector; rural development including alternatives to poppy production; and health. India will contribute US$100 million towards reconstruction. In addition Britain has promised to send 800 additional soldiers to take on the Taliban.

From the very first day when the democrats took control of the US Congress, they declared that the United States will refocus attention on Afghanistan and increase its military and non-military assistance to the country. With this objective in mind the Democratic Part leaders Hillary Clinton and Nancy Pelosi visited Afghanistan last January. The visits confirmed Afghanistan as a foreign policy priority of the Democratic Party.

Although this renewal of commitment to Afghanistan is indeed welcomed, but the overwhelming emphasis on winning the peace by military means is not likely, as in the past to succeed. Afghanistan's mounting problems can not be solved by military means alone. It needs much greater assistance for reconstruction, development and improvement of governance.

Afghanistan's problems are not purely home-grown. Sustainable peace in Afghanistan depends upon the destruction of the vast terrorist support infrastructure in Pakistan and arrest of Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership hiding in that country. Taliban and Al Qaeda have operational bases in Pakistan's Baluchistan and North Western Frontier Province from where they plan attacks against Afghan security forces and Western troops.

The question on most people's minds is whether more assistance largely spent on non-development priorities will actually help to improve the situation in Afghanistan. A careful study of donor policies the past five years has convinced many analysts and commentators that if the international donor strategy concerning Afghanistan continues to operate on the assumptions of the past five years and if it is not revised to meet today's pressing challenges then there will be little reason for assistance to improve the worsening situation in Afghanistan.

There is a widely held belief in the US and other Western countries that if Al-Qaeda and its terrorist network and allies like the Taliban are not defeated in Afghanistan then it will be far more difficult to stabilise Iraq and prevent future terrorist attacks against Europe and the US. Moreover, if the US and its Western allies are defeated in Afghanistan followed by Iraq, the stability of many pro-Western regimes in the Middle East could be seriously threatened. This is something neither the Democrats nor the Conservatives in the US would like to see happen. Therefore prioritising the stabilisation of Afghanistan over Iraq makes more sense to the Democrats.

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2,000 corrupt policemen

On the 8 th of Feb 2007, the provincial police chief of Kabul made it clear in his comments to the internal security commission of the lower house that some members of the police force were involved in committing crimes, destructive activities and sabotaging security and that they commit crimes while in police uniform. The Kabul provincial police chief stated that the police force inside Kabul's four main gates have separate allegiances to different groups and do not obey the orders coming from the ministry of interior affairs and the Kabul police department.

There have been similar criticisms made in the past against the Afghan police force from the national and international media as well as the people of Afghanistan , and it is often said that due to corruption in the police force crime statistics are growing everyday. But when such comments come from a high-ranking police officer it is very interesting and astonishing. Some analysts are of the opinion that the police authorities express this view in order to conceal the true ineffectiveness and incompetence of the police force. Such opinions come into existence at a time when the leadership council of the Afghan police know that the police forces are involved in abetting crimes within the community. If this is the case then why do they not take measures to dismiss these police officers at once?

The comments of the Kabul provincial police chief reveal that, those police forces who are involved in destruction and sabotage are supported by the higher ranking police authorities and crimes are committed under their protection, for otherwise their capture and dismissal would be an easy task. The police force in every country needs to be trusted, but if there is a criminal group inside the police force then whom can the nation trust? The Afghan police and their authorities are obliged to dismiss any criminal elements from the police force in order to persuade and gain the trust of the people these criminal elements should be brought before an open trial.

Sometime ago there were reports in the media that the provincial police chief of Baghlan province wanted to marry a girl from the province by force and that he had brought her to Kabul for this purpose. Now additional questions about corruption in the police force arises and that if such corrupt police officers and police chiefs are being appoint, how will the nation be persuaded that security can be maintained?

If the Afghan police authorities do not endeavour to cleanse their force of corrupt elements and if those who are accused of committing crimes are not pursued then it will mean that the police authorities themselves are supporting the criminals and corrupt groups in the police force and that they are not pledged to safeguarding the lives and the property of the people.

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PAKISTAN IS BURNING IN ITS OWN FIRE

In Afghanistan we have a proverb that 'he who digs a well must find himself at the bottom of it'. This proverb aptly describes the current situation in Pakistan . The suicide attacks over the past few weeks in many of Pakistan 's cities are a reminder of how things could go wrong when you play with fire. As part of national policy and for most of its existence, Pakistan has been supporting anti-government armed groups in Afghanistan and India . Its policy of support to insurgent and separatist elements in India and Afghanistan is based on its historical sense of insecurity. Afraid of India 's power, it has provided support to armed groups which are fighting Indian government control of their areas, such as in the north east and in Jammu and Kashmir . Because of its historical animosity with Afghanistan and its perceived closeness to India and wanting to have a ‘proxy' government in Kabul , Pakistan has over the years tried to destabilize governments in Kabul it saw as “unfriendly'. In the case of the Taliban and committed to its policy of “strategic depth' against India , Pakistan openly supported their drive to take the whole of Afghanistan . After the overthrow of the Taliban regime by US military action in late 2001, Pakistan apparently switched sides and sided with the US in its ‘war on terror'. But Taliban's recent rise and the ferocity of their military campaign has convinced many that Pakistan is fully supporting the Taliban against Hamid Karzai's government and its international backers.

The Waziristan peace agreement which the government of Pakistan signed with local Taliban militants allowed the establishment of a “terrorist haven” in the tribal areas of that country. Since the accord, the number of Taliban attacks inside Afghanistan and the casualty figures has sharply gone up. During 2006, Taliban attacks took the lives of more than 2000 Afghan civilians and scores of international troops and Afghan security forces. The tribal and secular parties of Pakistan , mainly Pashtun nationalist parties, constantly warned that sabotaging the peace and security in Afghanistan will not only harm Afghanistan but also hurt Pakistan . However, the hard-line military rulers of that country remained indifferent to these warnings and instead continued to train and finance terrorist groups based in its territory and kept the fire burning in Afghanistan .

The suicide attack in Dorggi that left seventy people dead and injured, the suicide attack in Qesa Khani in Peshawar, explosions in Quetta, rocket attacks on parts of Islamabad, the explosion in Dera-ye Ismael Khan, and the recent attack in the federal court in Quetta that left fifteen dead and more than forty others injured are the result of years of Pakistani support to terrorist groups. These militant groups have now turned their guns on their own masters and have turned Pakistan into a new front for their activities. We now see signs that the fire which Pakistan had ignited to turn on India and Afghanistan is being redirected by changed political circumstances and is engulfing Pakistan itself.

When in late January Pakistani security forces arrested six people with explosives in Dera-ye Ismael Khan, they confessed that they were taking their orders for suicide attacks from Taliban commanders in Waziristan . However, Baitullah Massoud, the leader of the Taliban in Waziristan rejected these claims. This shows that the Taliban and their backers in the Pakistan military are not happy about the close friendship which Mr. Musharraf has developed with Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair. By targeting Pakistani interests, they are sending a clear signal to him to change course.

After Musharraf came to power, more than 20000 religious schools or madrassas were teaching extremist ideologies and serving as recruiting grounds for Taliban and Kashmiri jihadi groups. The most prominent of these madrassas are administered by Pakistan 's Islamic parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam who happen to be Nr Musharraf's political allies in the two provinces bordering Afghanistan . These Madrassas are allegedly being funded by Pakistan spy agency the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The government of Mr. Musharraf is controlled by hardliners, both in the military and the political-Islamic coalitions supporting him. He is not capable of bringing any drastic changes to his country's policies with respect to India and Afghanistan . Pakistan 's policies towards these two countries are dictated by the Islamists and jihadists in the military and independently implemented by the provincial governments dominated by Islamic parties in Baluchistan and North-Wes Frontier Province (NWFP).

If Mr. Musharraf slightly deviates, he is directly threatened as evidenced by a number of attacks on his life. He indeed has a real dilemma: either he allows these extremists to continue with their jihadist policies and in return receives political support and legitimacy or he must act to dismantle their influence and infrastructure and face the threat of insurrection and direct threat to his life.

Unless the power and influence of Pakistan 's military and its notorious spy agency is checked by civilian authorities with direct mandate from the people, it is unlikely that things will change in Pakistan . Improving relations with India and Afghanistan is key to overcoming these hard-line elements so that peace can finally take hold in the region. It is indeed time that the west, in particular the US reviewed its strategy towards Pakistan . Instead of throwing its unconditional support behind a weakened military dictator surrounded by Islamic hardliners in his own military and the political coalition he has built around himself, a genuine effort to bring back elected civilian leadership to power in Pakistan should be broadly encouraged and supported. This is the only course left to the west to beat back the tide of extremism and anarchy in Pakistan and stabilize Afghanistan and the wider region.

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Rallies in Support of War Criminals Can't Silence Demands for Justice

The amnesty bill passed by the lower house of parliament and approved by the upper house will become law upon President Karzai's signature. The amnesty bill grants blanket amnesty and legal protection from prosecution to Afghanistan 's notorious war criminals and human rights violators.

On February 23, Afghanistan 's warlords and factional leaders with thousands of their supports gathered in Kabul 's Ghazi Stadium in order to build pressure on President Karzai to sign the proposed bill into law. They demanded that Karzai's government back their calls for forgiveness and reconciliation over accountability for past crimes. The rally, reports suggest was attended by only a handful of Kabul residents who suffered severely during the factional fighting in the capital in the early 1990s. Some estimates put the casualty figures at more than 50,000 people killed.

Friday's rally was significant for another reason. By openly threatening independent media and human rights organizations, the warlords and factional leaders confirmed two things. First, that they feel under pressure by media and civil society organizations involved in defence of human rights. Second, the threats are a clear sign of increased hostility towards media and human rights defenders, which would result in more harassment and attacks against them.

The amnesty bill has been widely condemned by the Afghan public and the international community alike. The United Nations has warned against strengthening of culture of impunity and depriving victims of their fundamental rights if the bill became law. Others have questioned the authority of the lower house to pass a legislation that undermines the constitutional rights of Afghan citizens to receive legal redress for violations of their fundamental rights. They argue that the amnesty bill is in clear breach of the Afghan constitution and is therefore illegal.

Knowing that the day will come when they have to answer for their crimes, these war criminals are trying to protect themselves from legal pursuit by any means possible. The trial and execution of Saddam Hussein is still fresh in their memories, despite the absence of a similar vindictive motif on the part of the United States government.

When the lower house passed the bill, the presidential spokesperson in response to a media query said that any legislation proposed by parliament which runs counter to the provisions of the Afghan constitution will not be signed into law by the president. At the Friday rally, president Karzai publicly retracted his own spokesperson's statement and said that he will have to seek legal advice on the bill before he signs it into law. The question is who will give him that advice and what will that advice be: sign or don't sign? And to what extent will this advice be influenced by his own know political considerations and those of his criminal warlord allies?

Good sense and the public mood demand that he does not sign it into law. Why? Because signing the amnesty bill into law will not only violate the Afghan constitution but will also seriously undermine the Action Plan for Peace Reconciliation and Justice which he publicly launched last December amidst bouts of sobbing and tears on the occasion of the international human rights day as Afghanistan's answer to its violent past.

The pessimist view on this is this: regardless of whether the president signs it or not, the Afghan public has passed its judgment on the country's war criminals. They have made it abundantly clear that the blood of countless innocent people will not be forgiven.

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NATO's Strategy in Afghanistan is Faulty

The Afghan crisis will not be resolved by simply increasing troop numbers

NATO recently announced the deployment of 1,000 additional UK troops to fight the resurgent Taliban in the south this year. The Alliance already has approximately 40,000 personnel under its command in Afghanistan . In addition to the country's south, these troops are performing duty in the northern, central, eastern and western parts of Afghanistan .

France , Germany , Italy , Spain and Turkey have agreed to send additional troops to Afghanistan , but are not ready to send their troops to the conflict-ridden south. Up to now only the British, Dutch, Canadian and American forces have been involved in fighting with the anti government elements in the south and south east.

With such a large number of troops in the country one wonders why NATO is sending more troops to Afghanistan . Why not for example re-locate troops from the relatively peaceful north to serve in the south instead of spending so much time and resources to recruit additional troops from increasingly unwilling contributing nations. Despite concerted efforts and repeated appeals, NATO faces the difficulty of convincing contributing nations to send more troops to the restive south, a fact that the Taliban have time and again used for their own propaganda purposes. NATO's inability to left 'national caveats' on troop deployment to the south has been touted by Taliban as a sign of increasing differences between the Alliance's major powers with regard to its military strategy in Afghanistan.

It is possible that NATO's objective in calling for more troops and hyping the Taliban threat has less to do with the reality of Afghanistan and is primarily aimed at creating concerns among the NATO member countries in order to attract more assistance at a time when the organization's overall value is in question. It is seen as a clever attempt by the organization to stay in business at very uncertain times.

On the ground the lack of coordination and agreement on common strategy is adding on to existing problems. Individual nations rely upon their own command and control structures and receive instructions and report back to their own national capitals instead of being incorporated into a single command and control structure based in Afghanistan .

Security sector analysts are of the view that instead of focusing on making NATO work in Afghanistan , the attention and resources should shift to strengthening the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police in order to take care of Afghanistan 's security needs in the short and long term. This they argue is the most sensible and sustainable option.

Although some predict a political solution to the current crisis in Afghanistan, it is necessary nevertheless that besides the use of military force, NATO countries and Afghanistan's other donors should also consider rebuilding the country's shattered economy in order to reverse the climate of fear and hopelessness which is haunting the Afghan public. Regional factors contributing to the growth of insurgency is a key issue which must be addressed if Afghanistan is to have any chance for long term peace and prosperity. Merely increasing troop numbers won't solve Afghanistan 's mounting problems.

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Taliban Have Good Reasons for Confronting NATO Forces in the South

Even though we haven't witnessed any serious conflict during the past days or months in Kandahar , Zabul or Uruzgan provinces, we should ask how the Taliban were able to gather together in Musa Qala. If this issue is examined properly, we will find that there are some factors behind the situation, and the first factor might be narcotics.  The presence of a great drug economy in Helmand and the benefits and business has provoked those opposed to the government [to fight] for profit.

The second factor is the financial and military support of the opposition forces by the mafia leaders.  Thus, the policy of making truces and compromises by the British forces with the Taliban has rather paved the ground for disagreements between the Afghan government authorities and American and British forces.  Regarding the centralization of the Taliban in Helmand, it is said that some 700 to 1000 fighters of the Al Qaeda group have been stationed in the province, and apart from Nad Ali, Nawey and a few other districts and the capital town of Lashkar Gah , the entire province is in the control of the Taliban.

In order to threaten the capital city of Lashkar Gah , a group of 300 Taliban fighters approached the Babaji area but the Afghan National Army pushed them back killing an injuring approximately 50 opposition fighters.  When Mullah Dadullah loudly challenges NATO and government forces, it does not mean that Taliban have become stronger, because they have not been able to occupy even a small stretch of the land from the government in other parts of the country. Taking control of the capital cities of Afghanistan is inconceivable.

According to estimates, around 2500-3000 Taliban fighters have gathered in Helmand, while around 8000 ANA, British, Dutch and Canadian forces have taken part in Operation Achilles and are equipped with the most modern weapons.  If all these forces are well-coordinated and back up the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes and all the parties work jointly for peace, the opposition groups will never be able to continue their war, or even to remain in the these southern provinces. The issue of rehabilitation is of great importance because the people should be reassured that the material basis of their lives can be maintained.

In the past, we saw that numerous such military operations took place, but as these operations were not meeting the day to day needs of the people, they never had any positive or lasting results. Now, it is necessary that the government and foreign forces, in addition to military operations, should also properly handle the rehabilitation process with full coordination and based on the needs of the people. If the challenge posed by the Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah is not adequately and timely answered, the morale of the Afghan people, government and the civil society institutions and their international partners who are struggling under very difficult conditions to deliver services will be adversely affected. Gradually we will observe the multiplier effects in other provinces of southern Afghanistan , making Taliban even stronger and more entrenched.

Despite the lack of visible progress on the military front and instead of pursuing short term and expensive military operations, NATO and Afghan forces would be better off if they took more practical measures for the strengthening of peace and stability in the south.

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Kabul-Kandahar Highway – A Benchmark of Security

As insecurity has risen, the areas along the Kabul-Kandahar Highway have seen serious challenges. Passengers who travel on the road do so at great personal risk. The Taliban threaten this important transit route around the clock. Insurgents stop passengers and search each person individually, checking their mobile phones and documents. They beat men who don't have beards and sometimes, they detain people. Government officials, foreigners and NGO workers risk kidnapping and death when they travel this route. The 21 kidnapped South Koreans were on their way to Kabul along this road when the Taliban abducted them. All these incidents occur during the daytime, just meters away from security checkpoints. The forces responsible for securing the highway only consider their own safety.

The Taliban's impact is felt not just on security, but also the economy. The 592-km highway extends all the way to Herat province. It is a vital trading route that connects the heart of the country with important trading posts. The Taliban exact high tolls and they loot transported goods, damaging business and livelihoods.

The question is, why are 40,000 foreign troops, 40,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and 60,000 policemen unable to secure this important highway? The Taliban are in control of several districts and some provincial centers, and their control is spreading.

After searching vehicles, the Taliban stay in the area for hours without fear of NATO and government attacks. Why then, are all these American, French and British aircrafts in Afghanistan? And why are they allowing the insurgents to consolidate their power? As insecurity grows, Afghans lose more and more confidence in the government and turn to the Taliban and its Al-Qaeda allies.

Today's situation is a reminder of 1979, when the mujahideen began to take control of the highways, cutting off Kabul from the rest of the country. Today, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and provinces like Farah, Nimroz, Zabul and Ghazni have become isolated. Residents of these provinces are forced to accept the Taliban's demands. Most have stopped traveling and they're letting their beards grow. Many others have quit their government jobs, fearing retribution.

The Taliban have seen positive results, and it is not unlikely that the insurgents will attempt to consolidate their control by targeting the Kandahar-Herat Highway and the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway.

The government and foreign troops still have the opportunity to deploy more troops along the Kabul-Kandahar Highway and strengthen their air and land patrols to regain control of this vital route. Not acting now will be a missed opportunity, and the enemy will be “a knife that cuts to the bone.”

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Taliban Ready for Talks - Agenda Unknown

Analysis by Lal Aqa Shirin*

KABUL , Sep 20 (IPS) - Taliban spokesperson, Qari Yusof Ahmadi, has confirmed to the press that the Taliban are ready to directly negotiate with the Afghan government.

In contrast to Ahmadi's previous statements, he said last week that the Taliban have never rejected negotiations with the government. Earlier he had insisted that talks would begin only on the condition that foreign troops leave Afghanistan .

Taliban agreed to negotiations a day after President Hamid Karzai extended an invitation for talks on Sep. 9. Although the positive response from the Taliban is welcome, it is important to consider what will be on the agenda for discussion and whether the negotiations will have the impact everyone is expecting.

Will the negotiations address the larger questions confronting Afghanistan or will these be reduced to few local deals in the south? Will these talks conclude an establishment of real peace in Afghanistan or merely buy time for the belligerents?

These are some of the questions Afghans are asking themselves. They are hopeful but they also know that the situation is very complex, which will require vision, patience and real leadership from both sides.

Equally important to remember are the interests of the international community, in particular the United States which invaded this country with a very specific goal in mind: to exact revenge on those who perpetrated the Sep. 11 attacks in the U.S. and those who harboured them, meaning the Taliban.

Interestingly, despite the invitation to talks, both sides are actively engaged in combat. Neither warring side has made any suggestion regarding putting a ceasefire in place as a pre-condition for negotiations, which is odd.

Although the initial toppling of the Taliban regime and driving out the al-Qaeda in end-2001 was welcomed by the Afghan people, subsequent military operations against the Taliban and other insurgents, with the resultant losses suffered by the civilian population caught in the cross fire has angered people and Afghan authorities.

It has undermined the credibility of the government and its international allies in pursuing their ‘war on terror' in Afghanistan .

From what is known, the government is keenly evaluating the Taliban's positive response to Karzai's offer of negotiations. The government has also welcomed the Taliban's decision to drop their previous pre-condition for foreign troops to leave Afghanistan before holding negotiations with the government.

Talking to the Taliban and reaching any deal with them will undoubtedly change the face of Afghan politics and may further strain relations with the Northern Alliance followers, who helped by U.S. money, Special Forces and air power, drove the Taliban from power.

The issue of negotiations with the Taliban is hotly debated in media and political circles. Some members of the Mushrano Jirga (Upper House of Parliament) have already accepted the principle of negotiating with the Taliban and have said that improvement of security in Afghanistan is directly linked to Taliban's participation in national politics.

A further point to carefully consider relates to who from the Taliban ranks will take part in the negotiations. Will the majority of Taliban leadership come to the negotiation table or only a few disaffected commanders who are unhappy about the Taliban's links to al-Qaeda?

The so-called moderate Taliban or new-Taliban represented by their former foreign minister Maulawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil or their former ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, have already warned the government and the international community that they must negotiate with the Taliban or risk further violence and ascendance of hard core Taliban who might refuse to negotiate at all.

But who do they really represent among the Taliban ranks? Do they really have any influence with the Taliban leadership that is waging the ongoing war? Can they bring them to the negotiation table? Should we be taking them seriously? By including people like Mutawakil and Zaif, can their participation in national politics weaken the hard core Taliban? Or should we be talking to the hard-core Taliban instead. Or, should we be doing both?

It is likely that the hard-core Taliban leadership with strong links to al-Qaeda will resist talking to the government and its international allies. What would be interesting to know is the numerical strength of these hard-core elements, how close their links are to al-Qaeda and the influence they have over the Taliban's war policy.

Only when this information is available can a strategy to influence their choices succeed. If it is found that the local commanders waging the war are largely acting independently and their agenda is not linked to al-Qaeda, the chances for holding negotiations and succeeding in them are much greater.

It is quite likely that the U.S. administration has realised the limit of its strategy in Afghanistan and is trying to consolidate its gains at the 2008 presidential elections, by orchestrating a deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban that can be heralded as a ‘success'.

Such a scenario makes good sense. For example, U.S. strategic interests will be guaranteed by ensuring the continuity of a friendly Afghan government and its ‘war on terror', with a slight modification of shifting its war focus from Taliban back to al-Qaeda.

(*Published under an agreement with The Killid Group)

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U.S-Iran Hostilities Harming Afghanistan

Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad is known as Israel 's top enemy. He once said that Israel should be wiped off the map of the world. Several days ago he said that if Israel attacks Iran , Iran will attack the nearest American military targets.

His comments serve as a warning for Afghanistan . American bases here, including in Shindand, Herat and Kandahar , are located within target range of Iranian missiles. Whether Iran can defeat modern American aircrafts and weapons is in doubt. Despite the good relations between Kabul and Tehran , it is important to note here that our country is an Iranian military target. When these potential strikes occur is known only to American and Israeli strategists.

Afghan-Iranian relations have always been paradoxical. On the one hand, Iran has infiltrated our government, political parties and media. On the other hand, attempts have been made to demonstrate that Iran is playing a positive role in Afghanistan , deflecting blame on Pakistan . The friendship between our countries is threatened by Iranian-American hostilities, and relations will break down unless American-Iranian relations improve. Our friendship is dependent on their relationship.

Many suspect that America 's presence in Afghanistan is tied to an attempt to surround Tehran , and Iranians are aware of this. They consider themselves as being at war with America . This is a dangerous situation because Afghanistan will be the first victim of a potential war between Iran and America . Furthermore, when America leaves the region, Afghans will be left to face Iranian hostilities.

America and NATO have attempted to show that Iran is complicit in the insecurity in Afghanistan . Undoubtedly, Iran is involved, but not to the same extent as Pakistan . The Afghan government needs to have a specific policy and convince the Americans not to interfere in our relations with Iran . If the problem is resolved, then the Iranians will change their minds about Afghanistan . What is important for Afghans today is to figure out how to escape this crisis. Our country has been a stage for competition, and analysts worry that our country will turn into a nuclear testing ground. Those who hold these concerns need to think of creative and proactive solutions and not delay; otherwise we will face a painful future.

We cannot dismiss Ahmadinejad's warning so easily. If this confrontation heats up, we will wonder how and why we became the victims.

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